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In this post we present the new version of the Burp Suite extension EsPReSSO - Extension for Processing and Recognition of Single Sign-On Protocols. A DTD attacker was implemented on SAML services that was based on the DTD Cheat Sheet by the Chair for Network and Data Security (https://web-in-security.blogspot.de/2016/03/xxe-cheat-sheet.html). In addition, many fixes were added and a new SAML editor was merged. You can find the newest version release here: https://github.com/RUB-NDS/BurpSSOExtension/releases/tag/v3.1

New SAML editor

Before the new release, EsPReSSO had a simple SAML editor where the decoded SAML messages could be modified by the user. We extended the SAML editor so that the user has the possibility to define the encoding of the SAML message and to select their HTTP binding (HTTP-GET or HTTP-POST).

Redesigned SAML Encoder/Decoder

Enhancement of the SAML attacker

XML Signature Wrapping and XML Signature Faking attacks have already been part of the previous EsPReSSO version. Now the user can also perform DTD attacks! The user can select from 18 different attack vectors and manually refine them all before applying the change to the original message. Additional attack vectors can also be added by extending the XML config file of the DTD attacker.
The DTD attacker can also be started in a fully automated mode. This functionality is integrated in the BurpSuite Intruder.

DTD Attacker for SAML messages

Supporting further attacks

We implemented a CertificateViewer which extracts and decodes the certificates contained within the SAML tokens. In addition, a user interface for executing SignatureExclusion attack on SAML has been implemented.

Additional functions will follow in later versions.

Currently we are working on XML Encryption attacks.

This is a combined work from Nurullah Erinola, Nils Engelbertz, David Herring, Juraj Somorovsky, and Vladislav Mladenov.

The research was supported by the European Commission through the FutureTrust project (grant 700542-Future-Trust-H2020-DS-2015-1).

Related word

Tor enables users to surf the Internet, chat and send instant messages anonymously, and is used by a wide variety of people for both Licit and Illicit purposes. Tor has, for example, been used by criminals enterprises, Hacktivism groups, and law enforcement agencies at cross purposes, sometimes simultaneously.

Nipe is a Script to make Tor Network your Default Gateway.

This Perl Script enables you to directly route all your traffic from your computer to the Tor Network through which you can surf the Internet Anonymously without having to worry about being tracked or traced back.

Download and install:

    git clone https://github.com/GouveaHeitor/nipe
    cd nipe
    cpan install Switch JSON LWP::UserAgent

Commands:

    COMMAND          FUNCTION
    install          Install dependencies
    start            Start routing
    stop             Stop routing
    restart          Restart the Nipe process
    status           See status

    Examples:

    perl nipe.pl install
    perl nipe.pl start
    perl nipe.pl stop
    perl nipe.pl restart
    perl nipe.pl status

Bugs

Report bugs in my email: [hi@heitorgouvea.me]

Download Nipe

What is Gridcoin?

Gridcoin is an altcoin, which is in active development since 2013. It claims to provide a high sustainability, as it has very low energy requirements in comparison to Bitcoin. It rewards users for contributing computation power to scientific projects, published on the BOINC project platform. Although Gridcoin is not as widespread as Bitcoin, its draft is very appealing as it attempts to eliminate Bitcoin's core problems. It possesses a market capitalization of $13,530,738 as of August the 4th 2017 and its users contributed approximately 5% of the total scientific BOINC work done before October 2016.

A detailed description of the Gridcoin architecture and technical terms used in this blog post are explained in our last blog post.

The Issues

Currently there are 2 implementation vulnerabilities in the source code, and we can mount the following attacks against Gridcoin:

We can steal the block creation reward from many Gridcoin minters
We can efficiently prevent many Gridcoin minters from claiming their block creation reward (DoS attack)

So why do we not just open up an issue online explaining the problems?

Because we already fixed a critical design issue in Gridcoin last year and tried to help them to fix the new issues. Unfortunately, they do not seem to have an interest in securing Gridcoin and thus leave us no other choice than fully disclosing the findings.

In order to explain the vulnerabilities we will take a look at the current Gridcoin source code (version 3.5.9.8).

WARNING: Due to the high number of source code lines in the source files, it can take a while until your browser shows the right line.

Stealing the BOINC block reward

The developer implemented our countermeasures in order to prevent our attack from the last blog post. Unfortunately, they did not look at their implementation from an attacker's perspective. Otherwise, they would have found out that they conduct not check, if the signature over the last block hash really is done over the last block hash. But we come to that in a minute. First lets take a look at the code flow:

In the figure the called-by-graph can be seen for the function VerifyCPIDSignature.

CheckBlock → DeserializeBoincBlock [Source]

Here we deserialize the BOINC data structure from the first transaction

CheckBlock → IsCPIDValidv2 [Source]

Then we call a function to verify the CPID used in the block. Due to the massive changes over the last years, there are 3 possible verify functions. We are interested in the last one (VerifyCPIDSignature), for the reason that it is the current verification function.

IsCPIDValidv2 → VerifyCPIDSignature [Source]
VerifyCPIDSignature → CheckMessageSignature [Source, Source]

In the last function the real signature verification is conducted [Source]. When we closely take a look at the function parameter, we see the message (std::string sMsg) and the signature (std::string sSig) variables, which are checked. But where does this values come from?

If we go backwards in the function call graph we see that in VerifyCPIDSignature the sMsg is the string sConcatMessage, which is a concatenation of the sCPID and the sBlockHash.
We are interested where the sBlockHash value comes from, due to the fact that this one is the only changing value in the signature generation.
When we go backwards, we see that the value originate from the deserialization of the BOINC structure (MiningCPID& mc) and is the variable mc.lastblockhash [Source, Source]. But wait a second, is this value ever checked whether it contains the real last block hash?

No, it is not....

So they just look if the stored values there end up in a valid signature.

Thus, we just need to wait for one valid block from a researcher and copy the signature, the last block hash value, the CPID and adjust every other dynamic value, like the RAC. Consequently, we are able to claim the reward of other BOINC users. This simple bug allows us again to steal the reward of every Gridcoin researcher, like there was never a countermeasure.

Lock out Gridcoin researcher
The following vulnerability allows an attacker under specific circumstances to register a key pair for a CPID, even if the CPID was previously tied to another key pair. Thus, the attacker locks out a legit researcher and prevent him from claiming BOINC reward in his minted blocks.

Reminder: A beacon is valid for 5 months, afterwards a new beacon must be sent with the same public key and CPID.

Therefore, we need to take a look at the functions, which process the beacon information. Every time there is a block, which contains beacon information, it is processed the following way (click image for higher resolution):

In the figure the called-by-graph can be seen for the function GetBeaconPublicKey.

We now show the source code path:

ProcessBlock → CheckBlock [Source]
CheckBlock → LoadAdminMessages [Source]
LoadAdminMessages → MemorizeMessages [Source]
MemorizeMessages → GetBeaconPublicKey [Source]

In the last function GetBeaconPublicKey there are different paths to process a beacon depending on the public key, the CPID, and the time since both were associated to each other.
For the following explanation we assume that we have an existing association (bound) between a CPID A and a public key pubK_A for 4 months.

First public key for a CPID received [Source]

The initial situation, when pubK_A was sent and bind to CPID A (4 months ago)

Existing public key for a CPID was sent [Source]

The case that pubK_A was resent for a CPID A, before the 5 months are passed by

Other public key for a CPID was sent [Source]

The case, if a different public key pubK_B for the CPID A was sent via beacon.

The existing public key for the CPID is expired

After 5 months a refresh for the association between A and pubK_A is required.

When an incoming beacon is processed, a look up is made, if there already exists a public key for the CPID used in the beacon. If yes, it is compared to the public key used in the beacon (case 2 and 3).
If no public key exists (case 1) the new public key is bound to the CPID.

If a public key exists, but it was not refreshed directly 12.960.000 seconds (5 months [Source]) after the last beacon advertisement of the public key and CPID, it is handled as no public key would exist [Source].

Thus, case 1 and 4 are treated identical, if the public key is expired, allowing an attacker to register his public key for an arbitrary CPID with expired public key. In practice this allows an attacker to lock out a Gridcoin user from the minting process of new blocks and further allows the attacker to claim reward for BOINC work he never did.

There is a countermeasure, which allows a user to delete his last beacon (identified by the CPID) . Therefore, the user sends 1 GRC to a special address (SAuJGrxn724SVmpYNxb8gsi3tDgnFhTES9) from an GRC address associated to this CPID [Source]. We did not look into this mechanism in more detail, because it only can be used to remove our attack beacon, but does not prevent the attack.

The responsible disclosure process

As part of our work as researchers we all have had the pleasure to responsible disclose the findings to developer or companies.

For the reasons that we wanted to give the developer some time to fix the design vulnerabilities, described in the last blog post, we did not issue a ticket at the Gridcoin Github project. Instead we contacted the developer at September the 14th 2016 via email and got a response one day later (2016/09/15). They proposed a variation of our countermeasure and dropped the signature in the advertising beacon, which would result in further security issues. We sent another email (2016/09/15) explained to them, why it is not wise to change our countermeasures and drop the signature in the advertising beacon.
Unfortunately, we did not receive a response. We tried it again on October the 31th 2016. They again did not respond, but we saw in the source code that they made some promising changes. Due to some other projects we did not look into the code until May 2017. At this point we found the two implementation vulnerabilities. We contacted the developer twice via email (5th and 16th of May 2017) again, but never received a response. Thus, we decided to wait for the WOOT notification to pass by and then fully disclose the findings. We thus have no other choice then to say that:

The whole Gridcoin cryptocurrency is seriously insecure against attacks and should not be trusted anymore; unless some developers are in place, which have a profound background in protocol and application security.

Further Reading

A more detailed description of the Gridcoin architecture, the old design issue and the fix will be presented at WOOT'17. Some days after the conference the paper will be available online.

Why Hack Facebook Messenger in Singapore?

You may be interested in hacking Facebook Messenger in Singapore (or anywhere else) for various reasons. If you suspect that your partner is having an affair, you may want to hack Facebook Messenger. Or, if you need to know what your kids are doing with the messenger, you will need to hack it to have real time access.

You know that both of these situations are pretty justifiable and you intend no unethical act. You shouldn't hack Facebook Messenger of someone doesn't relate to you by any means, such a practice can violate their privacy. Having that in mind, you can read the rest of this article and learn how to hack Facebook Messenger.

How to Hack Someone's Facebook Messenger in Singapore

IncFidelibus is a monitoring application developed by a team of dedicated and experienced professionals. It is a market leader and has a customer base in over 191+ countries. It is very easy to install the app, and it provides monitoring and hacking of Facebook for both iOS and Android mobile devices. You can easily hack into someone's Facebook messenger and read all of their chats and conversations.

Not just reading the chats, you can also see the photo profile of the person they are chatting to, their chat history, their archived conversations, the media shared between them and much more. The best part is that you can do this remotely, without your target having even a hint of it. Can it get any easier than this?

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Spying With IncFidelibus in Singapore

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Track FB Messages in Singapore

With IncFidelibus, you can view your target's private Facebook messages and group chats within a click. This feature also allows you to access the Facebook profile of the people your target has been interacting with. You can also get the media files shared between the two.

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IncFidelibus is equipped with a powerful keylogger. Using this feature, you can record and then read every key pressed by your target on their device.

This feature can help get the login credentials of your target. You can easily log into someone's Facebook and have access to their Facebook account in a jiffy.

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IncFidelibus control panel is equipped with a lot of other monitoring and hacking tools and services, including;

Other Social Media Hacking

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SIM card tracking

You can also track someone SIM card if someone has lost their device, changed their SIM card. You can get the details of the new number also.

Easy Spying Possible with IncFidelibus

Monitoring someone's phone is not an easy task. IncFidelibus has spent thousands of hours, had sleepless nights, did tons of research, and have given a lot of time and dedication to make it possible.

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prediksi togel jitu akurat mantap hari ini

Support For XXE Attacks In SAML In Our Burp Suite Extension

New SAML editor

Enhancement of the SAML attacker

Supporting further attacks

Additional functions will follow in later versions.

Related word

Nipe - A Script To Make TOR Network Your Default Gateway

Related links

Gridcoin - The Bad